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THE SUPREME COURT AND DISPUTES 
BETWEEN STATES 
.JI 
By CHARLES WARREN 
.JI 
President Bryan, Members of the Faculty, Ladies and Gen-
tlemen: 
One hundred and forty years ago, the Aurora, a news-
paper published in Philadelphia, wrote on June 30, 1800: 
"It must give pleasure to our readers to be informed that 
the students at William and Mary College at Virginia . . . 
constantly exhibit specimens of taste and talent, of erudition 
and patriotism, in publications in the cause of liberty and 
state which outnumber those of any other College and far 
exceed in merit." 
Confident that the present students of this college are no 
less distinguished than their predecessors for taste, talents, 
erudition, and patriotism, in the cause of liberty and state, 
I have taken for my subject an American institution closely 
bound up with liberty-liberty of the individual and of the 
states-the Supreme Court of the United States. I wish to 
portray to you one of its little known, though vitally im-
portant, functions, and the part which it has played in our 
National life as an arbiter in disputes between the states of 
our Union, As the present is distinctly an era of interna-
tional affairs, I hope that you will consider the bearing which 
the history of this phase of the Court has upon the possible 
future of a Wodd Court in international disputes. 
While it was at this college that the first American pro-
fessorship of law came into existence, nevertheless, I realize 
that I am not speaking merely to students of law; hence, I 
shall hope to give to you all some idea of this phase of the 
Court, in not too dry or technical language; for the Supreme 
Court is an American institution in which all citizens, and 
not merely those who may be called upon to study it, should 
have a keen interest. 
There is an appropriateness in this subject at this time; 
for exactly one hundred and fifty years ago last Friday, on 
February 2, 1790, the Supreme Court appointed by President 
Washington, convened for the first time with a quorum (at 
its session on February I, only three Judges were present). 
It met at one o'clock in the afternoon in a building known 
as the "Exchange," located across the foot of Broad Street 
at its junction with Water Street in New York City, and 
six blocks away from the Federal Hall at the comer of Broad 
and Wall Streets where Washington had been inaugurated 
and where the Congress was then sitting. In the second 
story of a hall, sixty feet long, in which the state legislature 
met in the mornings, there assembled on that day, Chief Jus-
tice John Jay of New York, and Justices William Cushing 
of Massachusetts, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, and, appro-
priately, John Blair of Virginia, a graduate of William and 
Mary College; there also was Edmund Randolph of Virginia, 
a graduate of William and Mary, and the first United States 
Attorney General. Writing to Randolph, Washington had 
said: "Impressed with a conviction that the true administra-
tion of justice is the firmest pillar of good governmen~, I 
have considered the first arrangement of the judicial depart-
ment as essential to the happiness of our country and the sta-
bility of its political system." This statement was true then 
and has been true ever since; for it would be impossible to 
say by what other means than by this Court the Bill of 
Rights could be enforced for the protection of the citizen, 
or the relations between the nation and the states could be 
kept in balance for the preservation of the rights of each. 
During the past few years, you have all heard much dis-
cussion, as well as diatribe, about decisions of the Court on 
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the subject of mlrumum wages, child labor, coal mmmg, 
labor, and other social and economic topics, under that part 
of the Constitution known as the Due Process Clause. You 
have equally heard much about interstate commerce and 
powers exercised by the Court under what is known as the 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution. From the recent mil-
lions of words and thousands of pages devoted to argument, 
statement, and misstatement on these subjects, you would very 
probably assume that the only decisions of the Court of im-
portance in our national life and history were those which 
had restricted the nation and the states in dealing with labor 
and business and social relations. There is, however, a great 
lack of proportion in dwelling on this phase of the Court's 
functioning; for it is only within the last thirty years that 
Congress has exercised its powers under the Commerce 
Clause on any subject other than railroads, liquor, and mo-
nopolies (with regard to which the Court has always upheld 
the Congress); and it is only within the last forty years that 
the Court has dealt to any great extent under the Due 
Process Clause with state or national powers in economic and 
social fields. On the other hand, the really important de-
cisions of the Court which influenced the development of 
the United States in its first one hundred years have been 
made in upholding the general sovereign authority of the 
nation and in guarding the contract rights and civil liberties 
of the citizens against either states or the nation, and in per-
forming one more function-that to which I wish, this morn-
ing, to call your attention, for it is little known and little 
discussed. This function is the exercise of power to settle 
with finality serious disputes which have arisen or may arise 
between the states of the Union regarding their boundaries, 
their territory, their waters, their sanitation and protection, 
and their contract rights. You may be unaware of the exist-
en~e of such state disputes, and it will probably surprise you, 
as well as most Americans, to know that in the past one hun-
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dred years of our country's history there have been at least 
77 reported suits brought by one state against another in the 
Supreme Court, requiring at least 124 reported decisions by 
the Court; and that at one time or another, every single state 
of the Union (with the exception of Maine) has been either 
a complainant or a defendant in such a suit in the Court-
all except nine having been complainants and all except 
eleven defendants. In addition, there have been sixteen suits 
by the United States against a state; and there have been two 
suits by a foreign nation against a state.1 
Now, how did the Court get the power to require sovereign 
states to appear before it and to settle their quarrels? It all 
came from a very simple provision in the Judiciary Article 
of the Constitution, giving to the Court jurisdiction over 
"controversies between two or more states," and requiring 
that such suits should be begun originally in the Supreme 
Court and not in any lower court. 
Why was this gravely important function vested in the 
Court? Like most of the other provisions in our Federal 
Constitution, it was not evolved as a part of a logical plan 
or theory of government. It arose out of hard, previous 
experience of lJlen in the colonies and in the states prior to 
1787. It was the product of actual necessitous conditions; 
and as Sir Henry Maine said, fifty years ago in his Popular 
Government, it "was the fruit of signal sagacity and pre-
science applied to these necessities." 
Weare in the habit of regarding the American Colonies 
prior to the Revolution as having more or less common con-
ditions, united in interests, and opposed only to Great Britain. 
The fact is that the colonies varied very greatly, both in 
racial composition, in economic and social habits and condi-
tions, in religious views, and in some colonies even in differ-
ence of language. Each colony was more or less of a land-
1 Cuba v. North Carolina (1917), 242 U. S. 665 ; Monaco v. M ississippi, 
(1934) , 292 U. S. 313; see also Ex parte Republic of Portugal ( 1922), 264 
U. S. 575. 
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grabber from other colonies; for their English charters and 
patents frequently overlapped in territory and displayed little 
knowledge of American geography. Hence, boundary dis-
putes were frequent. 2 Differences as to commerce and matters 
other than boundaries also aroused much bitterness of feeling 
between the Middle Colonies and N ew York on the one 
side and New England on the other, and between New 
England and the South. When a declaration of independ-
ence was being discussed, in April, 1776, Carter Braxton of 
Virginia wrote that: "The Middle Colonies dread their 
being swallowed up," between the claims of Virginia "and of 
those from the East," and that he was convinced that before 
they declared their independence "all disputes must be healed 
and harmony prevail" by the appointment of a superintend-
ing power; and that if independence "was to be now asserted, 
the Continent would be tom in pieces by intestine wars and 
convulsions." Benjamin Franklin, as early as 1775, had sug-
gested that a representative Congress should have power "of 
settling all disputes and differences between colony and 
colony about limits or any other cause if such should arise." 
The American Colonies were familiar with the power pos-
sessed by the King's Privy Council in England to settle 
boundary controversies arising under charters granted by the 
King. Such disputes were heard in England by one of the 
Council's political or executive committees, termed the Lord 
Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, or by Commis-
sioners in America specially appointed from the residents of 
colonies adjacent to the disputants. Upon petition filed, the 
tribunal proceeded in a semi-judicial manner to summon the 
opposing party; and if it failed to appear, 'the case could be 
heard ex-parte and decision rendered. Three decisions in 
2 The Colonial Period of American History (1936), by Charles M. An-
drews, II, 53: "Men living along the border claimed by both colonies, 
were wholly at a loss to know in whose jurisdiction their lands lay and 
to whom they should pay their taxes. Quarrels ensued, reprisals occurred 
and individuals were arrested and jailed and the whole region was in 
an uproar." 
such boundary cases had been made by the Privy Council and 
were widely known in the colonies prior to the year 1776-
that of Rhode Island against Connecticut in 1727; that of 
Rhode Island against Massachusetts in 1746; and that of New 
Hampshire against Massachusetts in 174 I. It was natural, 
therefore, that within eight days after the colonies declared 
their independence as sovereign states, John Dickinson, on 
July 12, 1776, in the Continental Congress should draft a 
plan for a procedure to be set up by the new states to settle 
their quarrels, similar to that before the King in Council; and 
his proposal resulted in a provision of the Articles of Con-
federation in 1781, authorizing the Congress, as "the last re-
sort on appeal" for "all disputes and differences . . . between 
two or more states concerning boundary, jurisdiction, or any 
other cause whatever," to constitute a court for each case 
as it arose and to appoint "commissioners or judges" with 
power to proceed to final judgment, even if a defendant 
state refused to appear (Article IX).3 Though such a pro-
vision resembled an arbitration more than a court, since new 
judges were appointed for each case and there was no penna-
nent body, nevertheless, this was the first time in history in 
which a judicial tribunal came into existence with a com-
a If parties could not agree on the judges, the following singular mode 
of selection was provided: Congress should name 39 persons (3 from each 
State) from which list, each party should strike one alternatively until the 
number reached 13, and from that number 7 to 9 were drawn by lot who 
should be the judges, with power to five to act. John Franklin Jameson, 
in his "The Predecessor of the Supreme Court," in Essays on the Constitu-
tional History of the United States in the Formative Period, 1775-1789 
(1889), says as to this method of choice of judges: "It seems obvious 
that we have here a reproduction of the machinery provided by Mr. 
Grenville's famous Act of 1770 for the trial of disputed elections to the 
House of Commons. Up to that time, disputed elections had for nearly a 
century been passed upon by the whole House. The natural result of 
such a procedure was a scandalous disregard of justice, those contestants 
who belonged to the majority party being uniformly admitted, their com-
petitors as uniformly rejected. To remedy this abuse, Mr. Grenville's Act 
provided that 49 members should be chosen by ballot, and that from this 
list, the petitioner and the sitting member should strike out names alter-
natively until the number was reduced to 13-a process which later became 
kn<~wn, in the slang of the House, as 'knocking out the brains of the 
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pulsory jurisdiction over independent, sovereign states. And 
Robert R. Livingston, then Secretary of Foreign Affairs for 
the Unitecf States, wrote to Lafayette, January 10, 1783, 
as to the one case then recently decided by such a tribunal: 
The great cause between Connecticut and Pennsylvania has been 
decided in favor of the latter. It is a singular event. There are 
few instances of independent states submitting their cause to a court 
of justice. The day will come, when all disputes in the great re-
public of Europe will be tried in the same way, and America will 
be quoted to exemplify the wisdom of the measure. 
This was a remarkable prophecy, and one which was par-
tially fulfilled when, 139 years later, the Permanent Court 
of International Justice met for the first time at The Hague 
ill 1922. 
For various reasons, only three courts were ever ap-
pointed under the Articles of the Confederation-one in a 
dispute between Massachusetts and New York (June 9, 
1785), another in a dispute between South Carolina and 
Georgia (September 13, 1786)-these two being finally set-
tled by compacts. The third involved a dispute between 
Connecticut and Pennsylvania, in which settlers from Con-
necticut claimed title under its charter to lands in Luzerne, 
Northumberland, and Northampton Counties in Pennsyl-
vania. For many years, there had been a semi-warfare in 
that territory with attendant bloodshed, and the warfare 
would probably have been even more prolonged and serious 
if the settlers had known that the land in controversy was, 
many years later, to become the richest coal mining region 
of the country, including within its limits, the present cities 
of Easton, Scranton, Wilkesbarre, Wyoming, and Towanda. 
committee.' . . . These 13 with an additional member nominated by 
each contestant constituted the authoritative tribunal. The act, celebrated 
at the time, was, of course, perfectly well known to lawyers in America, 
six years after its passage. It seems plain that, with the natural substitu-
tion of 39 for 49, we have, in this peculiar process established shortly 
before in England, the model on which Congress framed its scheme for 
constituting temporarily a judiciary body when one was required for land 
disputes." 
It was, in fact, an American Sarre Basin. The court ap-
pointed in this case found in favor of Pennsylvania in 1782; 
but owing to the absence of any power in the court or in 
Congress to enforce its decree, hostilities were soon renewed 
and the situation continued troublesome and dangerous. 
James Madison deplored the lack in the Congress of "power 
of carrying into effect the judgment of their own courtS."4o 
Richard D. Spaight wrote to Governor Martin of North 
Carolina, October 16, 1784: "The disputes between Penn-
sylvania and Connecticut for the Wyoming lands, and New 
York and Vermonters, with the support and promises which 
the New England States have given the latter, have sown the 
seeds of dissention which I think will not end without a civil 
war."5 
When the Federal Convention met in 1787 for the fram-
ing of the Constitution, serious interstate disputes over lands, 
boundaries, and river rights were pending, involving at least 
ten states, as well as V ermont which had declared its inde-
pendence. It is little realized now to what a high degree the 
states of this country then regarded themselves as sovereign 
and independent, except so far as they might have surren-
dered certain rights of sovereignty to the United States un-
der the Articles of Confederation. For instance, Connecti-
cut, in its statute adopting a declaration of rights and privi-
4 This lack of power of enforcement was referred to in the Federal 
Convention five years later, by James Madison ( Yates Notes, June 19, 
1787), who said: "Has not Congress been obliged to pass a conciliatory 
Act in support of a decision of this Federal court between Connecticut 
and Pennsylvania, instead of having the power of carrying into effect 
the judgment of their own court?" In his Notes of Debates, June I(}, 
1787, Madison reports his own speech as follows: "Have we not seen 
the public land dealt out to Connecticut to bribe her acquiescence in the 
decree constitutionally awarded against her claim on the territory of Penn-
sylvania, for no other possible motive can account for the policy of Con-
gress in that measure?" 
I) Letters of the Members of the Continental Congress, VII. Richard 
Henry Lee, President of Congress, sending to John Rutledge, January 24, 
1785, his appointment as judge in the Massachusetts-New York case, wrote: 
"The future concord and happiness of the United States depends emi-
nently upon the wise and early settlement of such disputes." 
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leges, tenned itself a "republic" which "shall forever be and 
remain a free, sovereign, and independent State." Massachu-
setts in its Constitution of 1780 (which is still in force) de-
clared itself "a free, sovereign, and independent body politic 
or state by the name of the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts." Pennsylvania, Virginia and other states used similar 
language. In the midst of the dispute between New York 
and Vermont in which anned forces were being used, John 
Hancock as Governor of Massachusetts, in 1784, issued a 
proclamation of neutrality calling upon her citizens to re-
frain from aiding either party, and using language in part 
practically the same as that used by President Washington 
in his neutrality proclamation in the war between France 
and England and by President Roosevelt in the present war. 
Experience, therefore, had shown to the members of the 
Federal Convention that there was a grave need for a more 
satisfactory method of adjusting these boundary and other 
interstate disputes, and that for their adjudication a penna-
nent court with power to enforce its decrees was necessary. 
And it was out of such necessity that the convention finally 
decided to give to the new Supreme Court, which it was co~­
stituting, jurisdiction "in controversies between two or more 
states."6 
6 The course of action of the Federal Convention of 1787 was as follows: 
Following the Virginia Plan, which Edmund Randolph originally sub-
mitted, the framers at first provided (on July 18) that the jurisdiction 
of the National Judiciary should extend to "cases arising under the laws 
passed by the General Legislamre and to such other questions as involve 
the National peace and harmony"-but it had been the intention of the 
Convention (as Madison later wrote) that this general language should 
later be made more specific by precise enumeration. In a draft submitted 
to the Committee on Detail, Randolph specified that: "The jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Tribunal shall extend ... to such other cases as the 
National Legislamre may assign as involving the National peace and har-
mony . . . in disputes between different States." When the Committee 
reported on August 6, 1787, they provided that the jurisdiction of the 
Court should extend specifically "to controversies between two or more 
States (except such as shall regard territory or jurisdiction) ." Boundary 
and jurisdictional disputes between States, the Committee left to the Senate 
to decide through the appointment of a Special Court for each case, 
picked by the Senate in the same way as the similar tribunal picked 'by 
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The fundamental reason for this jurisdiction was that there 
are only three ways of settliug a dispute-by force, by treaty 
or agreement, and by judicial decision. Now the Constitu-
tion, by express provision forbade the States of the Union 
to wage war or to make treaties or alliances, or to make 
compacts without the consent of Congress. Some method 
of settlement of disputes had to be provided, and the only 
method left was settlement by a court. 
This being the basis of the Court's jurisdiction, it naturally 
follows that it has the power to determine any class of dis-
pute (other than a purely political one); and · as an illustra-
tion of how really international is its power, when Missouri 
in 1906 sued Illinois (200 U. S. 496) for seriously damaging 
the flow of the Mississippi River by sewage, Judge Holmes 
in his opinion pointed out that such a nuisance caused by 
a European nation bordering on the Danube as against a na-
tion lower down on that river, might easily under some cir-
cumstances amount to a casus belli. In this country, he said, 
"if such a nuisance were created by a state upon the Missis- , 
the Congress under the Confederation. When the Senate Article came 
on for debate on August 24, 1787, John Rutledge said that "this provision 
for deciding controversies between the States was necessary under the 
Confederation, but will be rendered unnecessary by the National Judiciary 
now to be estaBlished." Dr. Samuel W. Johnson and Roger Sherman of 
Connecticut, James Milson of Pennsylvania, and Jonathan Dayton of New 
Jersey concurred with him in moving to strike it out. Hugh Williamson 
of North Carolina thought it might be "a good provision in cases where 
the Judiciary were interested or too closely c0l!nected with the parties." 
Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts said: "The Judges might be con-
nected with the States being parties." He was, inclined to think the mode 
proposed in the clause would be more satisfactory than to refer such cases 
to the judiciary. The motion to strike out, however, prevailed, and the 
Court was left with the power over "controversies between two or more 
States" as now provided in Article III, Section 2, without any liInitation 
or specification as to nature of the controversies, whether as to bound-
aries, jurisdiction, or other cause. And it is interesting to note that a 
proIninent member of the Convention, Abraham Baldwin of Georgia, a 
Yale graduate, told President Stiles of Yale, only three months after the 
Federal Convention, that the delegates "had been unanimous in the ex-
pediency and necessity of a Supreme Judiciary Tribunal of universal juris-
diction in controversies of a legal nature between States. . .." This 
was one of tne very few subjects of importance on which unaniInity 
prevailed. 
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sippi, the nuisance would be resolved by the more peaceful 
means of a suit in this Court."7 As Chief Justice Taft said 
in 1921, when North Dakota sued Minnesota (256 U. S. 220) 
for flooding its farms by an improper drainage system, the 
jurisdiction of the Court "was conferred by the Constitu-
tion as a substitute for the diplomatic settlement of contro-
versies between sovereigns and a possible resort to force." 
F or the first sixty years of our history, the only state dis-
putes presented to the Court related to state boundaries, and 
even of this type of suit there were only three brought be-
tween 1789 and 1849-one by the State of New Yerk against 
Connecticut as early as 1799, and the next two-New Jersey 
v. New York and Rhode Island v. Massachusetts-did not 
occur until the 1830's. The New Jersey case was settled 
by a compact after Chief Justice Marshall announced that the 
Court would proceed with the case ex-parte, in the event 
that New York refused to answer summons and file answer. 
The Rhode Island case was bitterly fought at every stage 
of the litigation for fourteen years, from 1832 to 1846. The 
importance of the question involved cannot be over-esti-
mated, namely, whether a boundary dispute was a political 
matter and which a Court could not decide, or whether it 
was a legal matter and subject to the Court's power under 
the Constitution. The facts involved were also of grave im-
port to the respective states, since a strip of land on the 
southern boundary of Massachusetts of about 150 square 
miles, and the political and taxable status of about 5,000 in-
habitants would be affected by the decision. The question 
was settled forever and the power of the Court was upheld,. 
7 Judge Shiras said in H)OI in this suit of Missouri against Illinois (180 
U. S. 208): "If Missouri were an independent and sovereign state, aU 
must admit that she could seek a remedy by negotiation, and, that failing, 
by force. Diplomatic powers and the right to make war having been 
surrendered to the general government, it was to be expected that upon 
the latter would be devolved the duty of providing a remedy." 
in a superb opinion by Judge Baldwin concurred in by all 
the justices except Chief Justice Taney.s 
Since that decision in 1838 up to June, 1939, there have 
been at least twenty-nine cases involving state boundaries. 
And lest you may think that such cases are of minor im-
portance, let me call your attention to the fact that in at 
least four of these boundary cases, the jurisdiction of the 
Court was invoked only after armed forces had been called 
into play by the conflicting states and after bloodshed had 
occurred. As an instance of the seriousness of a boundary 
dispute, let me cite the case involving the northern boundary 
of Missouri and the southern boundary of Iowa in 1849, 
which involved sovereignty over a valuable strip of terri-
tory of about 2,000 square miles-a tract about two-thirds 
the size of Alsace.9 This controversy had been pending for 
twelve years; Missouri at one time had called out 1,500 
troops and Iowa' 1,100; to defend their respective alleged 
rights. The conflict of claims was the more serious, by 
reason of the fact that if Missouri prevailed, these 2,000 
square miles would become additional slave territory; if Iowa 
won, they would be free. The Court finally decided in favor 
of Iowa. Thus, just at a time when the dire question of 
slavery was ' threatening the stability of the Union in every 
political direction, a decision of the Court settled its fate for 
2,000 square miles of American territory. No wonder that 
Lewis Cass, Senator from Michigan rose in the Senate, in 
1855, and saia: "It is a great moral spectacle to see the 
decree of the judges of our Supreme Court on the most vital 
questions obeyed in such a country as this. They determine 
questions of boundaries between independent states, proud 
SNew York v. Connecticut (1799),4 Dallas 1,3,6; New Jersey v, New 
York (1830), 3 Peters 461, (1831) 5 Peters 284; Rhode Island v. Massachu-
setts (1833), 7 Peters 651, (1837) II Peters 226, (1838) I2 Peters 657, 755, 
(1839) 13 Peters 23, (1840) 14 Peters 210, (1841) 15 Peters 233, ( 1846) 4 
Howard 591. 
9 Missouri v. Iowa (1849),7 Howard 660; (1850) 10 Howard I; ( 1896) 
160 u. S. 688; (1897) 165 u. S. 118. 
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of their character and position, and tenacious of their rights, 
but who yet submit. They have stopped anned men in our 
country. Iowa and Missouri had almost got to anns about 
their boundary line, but they were stopped by the interven-
tion of the Court. In Europe, annies run lines and they run 
them with bayonets and cannon. They are marked with ruin 
and devastation. In our country, they are run by an order 
of the Court. They are run by an unarmed surveyor with 
his chain and his compass, and the monuments of devasta-
tion but peaceable ones." 
In the case of United States v. Texas, decided in 1896, 
the ownership of Greer County in the then Indian Terri-
tory, involving 1,500,576 acres of 2,360 square miles, just 
the size of Delaware and twice that of Rhode Island and 
Connecticut plus half of Massachusetts, was claimed by Texas 
as against the United States. Texas settlers had intruded 
on the Government public lands. Men had been killed. 
The House Judiciary Committee in 1882 had reported: "It 
is manifest that some means should be taken to settle this 
dispute as soon as possible. ... Conflicts are arising be-
tween the United States authorities and persons claiming to 
exercise rights on the disputed tract ... ; bloodshed and even 
death has resulted from this conflict." President Arthur in 
1884 and President Cleveland in 1887, by proclamation, had 
warned that "the aid and assistance of the military forces 
of the United States will be invoked to remove all such in-
truders." In I 890, Congress directed that suit be brought 
against Texas; and in I 896, this serious and long standing 
controversy was settled by the Supreme Court in a decision 
which fixed" the boundary in favor of the United States and 
thus transferred Greer County (now most valuable land) 
from Texas to Oklahoma.10 
In 1906, another boundary case was decided which had 
involved bloodshed and had been brought by Louisiana 
10 United States v. Texas (1892), 143 U. S. 621; (1896) 162 u. S. I. 
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against Mississippi (202 U. S. I), to save to th~ former State 
very valuable oyster fisheries. The controversy had been 
pending for ten years; each State had appointed armed pa-
trols, and by statutes and by force had sought to exclude 
fishermen of the other State. Finally, as was stated in the 
decision "in view of the danger of an armed conflict," the 
oyster commissions of the two States adopted a joint resolu-
tion establishing a neutral territory, pending a decision of 
the Supreme Court. The situation was precisely that of an 
economic conflict in mutually claimed territory, which, if oc-
curring between nations of Europe or elsewhere, would be 
very probable cause of war. The Court held that the bound-
ary line claimed by Louisiana was correct and had been too 
long in the past acquiesced in to be now revised. 
In 1921, a contest between Oklahoma and Texas and the 
United States was decided, fixing their boundary involving 
immensely valuable oil rights. In this case, settlers from the 
two states had located on the same lands in and adjacent to 
the bed of the Red River, and the seriousness of the situa-
tion is shown by the statement of Justice Van Devanter in 
his decision that "possession of parts of the bed was being 
taken and held by intimidation and force; that in suits for 
injunction, the courts of both states were assuming jurisdic-
tion over the same areas; that armed conflicts between rival 
aspirants for the oil and gas had been but narrowly averted 
and still were imminent; that the militia of Texas had been 
called to support the orders of its courts, and an effort was 
being made to have the militia called for a like purpose." 
On initiation of the suit, the Court appointed Frederic A. 
Delano as a receiver of the territory involved, viz., 43 miles 
of river bed, or about 200 square miles in ten counties of 
Oklahoma and eleven counties of Texas. The receiver, on 
taking possession ejected all settlers and appointed a force 
of 12 picked men to protect life and property; he was 
the ruler, for five years, of a tract of land larger than the 
[ 16 ] 
State of Rhode Island; and the value of the subject matter 
involved in the case may be judged from the fact that in 
his final report to the Court, the Receiver accounted for over 
$ I 4,000,000 worth of oil developed by him in operating the 
properties from 1920 to 1925 .n 
Apart from averting force and bloodshed, boundary cases 
have often involved lands and questions of very great im-
portance to the states. Thus, in the Florida-Georgia case 
in 1855, the ownership of 1,200,000 acres of land was at 
stake; in the Virginia-West Virginia case in 1871, two whole 
counties (Jefferson and Berkeley); in the Iowa-Illinois case 
in 1893, the valuable right to tax the numerous bridges across 
the Mississippi River from Keokuk to Dubuque; in the Vir-
ginia-Tennessee case in 1893, a strip of territory 118 miles 
in length by five in width; in the Washington-Oregon case, 
in 1908, valuable salmon fisheries; in the New Mexico-Colo-
rado case in 1925, a long strip of Colorado's southern bound-
ary, including a town, two villages and five post offices; in 
the New Jersey-Delaware case, in 1934, vary valuable oyster 
fisheries in Delaware Bay and River. In the New Mexico-
Texas case in 1927, in which I acted as Special Master ap-
pointed by the Court, in deciding the boundary between the 
two States north of El Paso, the Court was obliged to decide 
where the boundary between the Republic of Mexico and 
the United States lay in the year 1850.12 
During the past thirty-six years, however, as the economic 
relations between the states have become more complicated, 
with the advance of modem life, cases presenting facts and 
law of great difficulty and of even more vital importance to 
the states have been brought before the Court. 
11 Oklahoma v. Texas (1921),256 U. S. 70; (1922) 258 U. S. 606; (1923) 
260 U. S. 606. 
12 Florida v. Georgia (1850), II Howard 293; (1855) 17 Howard 478; 
Virginia v. West Virginia (1871), II Wallace 39,67; Iowa v. Illinois (1893), 
147 U. S. 1 ; Washington v. Oregon (1908), 2 II U. S. 127; Virginia v. 
Tennessee (1893), 148 U. S. 509; New Mexico v. Colorado (1925), 267 
U. S. 30, 582; New Mexico v. Texas (1927), 275 U. S. 279; New Jersey v. 
Delaware (1934), 291 U. S. 381. 
In 1900, a novel and very grave source of dispute was 
presented in a suit by Louisiana against Texas (176 U. S. I). 
The latter state by statute had given to her officials wid\! 
powers to enforce very drastic quarantine regulations and 
to detain vessels, persons, and propeny coming into Texas. 
In 1899, a health officer of Texas took advantage of a single 
case of yellow fever in New Orleans to lay an embargo on 
all commerce between that city and the State of Texas, and 
this embargo was enforced by anned guards posted at the 
frontier. Louisiana alleged that the yellow fever was a 
mere pretext, that the real motive was to divert commerce 
from New Orleans to the pon of Galveston in Texas, and 
that this was shown by the fact that no embargo was main-
tained against commerce coming to Galveston from the 
seriously infected pons of Mexico. Accordingly, Louisiana 
sought an injunction against Texas and its officials. The 
vital issue was raised as to the extent to which a sovereign 
state may manipulate its own domestic laws for the purpose, 
or with the necessary result, of inflicting a direct injury on 
another state. The Court found that the action of the Texas 
health officer had not been the act of the state, and so dis-
missed the suit; but the language of Justice Brown (who filed 
a concurring opinion) is particularly significant as showing 
that the source of the dispute which thus came before the 
Coun for adjudication was precisely such as, if arising be-
tween foreign nations, might occasion a war, and that if the 
facts had been sufficient, the Coun might well have had 
jurisdiction; said Justice Brown: 
In view of the solicitude which, from time immemorial, states 
have manifested for the interest of their own citizens; of the fact 
that wars are frequently waged by states in vindication of individual 
rights of which the last war with England, the opium war of 1840 
between Great Britain and China, and the war which is now being 
carried on in South Africa between Great Britain and the Transvaal 
Republic, are all notable examples. ... It would seem a strange 
anomaly if a state of this Union, which is prohibited by the Con-
stitution from levying war upon another state, could not invoke 
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the authority of this Court by suit, to raise an embargo which had 
been established by another state against its citizens and their prop-
erty. 
A year later, in 1901, the Court had before it another 
serious source of state controversy when Missouri filed 
against Illinois a bill in equity seeking to enjoin the latter 
state from diverting the sewage of Chicago from Lake Michi-
gan into the Illinois River and eventually so polluting the 
waters of the Mississippi as to endanger through typhoid 
germs the health of the citizens of Missouri. The.re was thus 
presented the grave question as to how far one state could 
institute a public nuisance, to the detriment of another. The 
right of the Court to take jurisdiction over any such ques-
tion was vigorously assailed by Illinois; but the Court sus-
tained its power to act, and held that if the health and com-
fort of the inhabitants of a state are so threatened, the state 
itself is a proper party to represent themY The Court, how-
ever, recognized that a decision on the question might deter-
mine the future use of the rivers in this country; and it re-
fused to make a final disposition of the case until after fullest 
evidence had been taken. As Justice Holmes said: 
It is a question of first magnitude whether the destiny of the 
great rivers is to be the sewers of the cities along their banks or to 
be protected against everything which threatens their purity. To 
decide the matter at one blow by an irrevocable fiat would be at 
least premature. 
While the Court finally found the evidence to be insuffi-
cient and dismissed the case, its decision gave assurance that 
it would defend the right of a state against a nuisance created 
by another state. Two later cases have arisen presenting the 
fact of such a nuisance-one by New York against New Jer-
sey to enjoin the Passaic Valley Sewage Commission from 
-polluting the waters of the New York Upper Bay to the 
"grave injury to the health, property, and commercial wel-
13 Missouri v. Illinois (1901), 180 u. S. 208; (1906) 200 U. S. 496,598. 
fare of the State of New York." (2.56 U. S. 296.) The 
Court, after thirteen years of hearings and argument finally 
held in 1921, that: "Considering all of this evidence . . . 
we must conclude that the complainants have failed to show 
by the convincing evidence wh~ch the law requires that the 
sewerage . . . would so corrupt the water of the Bay as to 
create a public nuisance ... or that it would seriously add to 
the pollution of it." Recognizing, however, the importance 
of the ruling which it was making to the great population 
interested, it stated that it would dismiss the bill without 
prejudice to the right of New York to renew its application, 
if conditions should change in the future. 
In New Jersey v. New York, in 1931, the dumping of gar-
bage by the defendant to the injury and pollution of the 
plaintiff's waters and beaches was enjoined by the Court in 
a decree ordering New York City to construct incinerators 
for its garbage, and in case of failure to construct them with-
in a fixed time to pay to New Jersey the sum of $ 5 ,000 a 
day in damages.14 
Of recent years, the cases most vital to the prosperity of 
the states, and of greatest effect upon their future economic 
and historical development, have been those dealing with the 
rights to water. Men on the eastern seaboard do not fully 
realize the part that water plays in the arid regions of the 
southwest, and of the northwest, where water means life and 
property to millions of people. Without it, a state may stand 
still or wither away; its agriculture may decline, its inhab-
itants remove, its prosperity vanish. No more determined 
and vigorous conflicts have arisen since slavery days than 
those maintained in the assertion by states of their claims 
to the waters of interstate rivers, especially for irrigation 
purposes. And no decisions of more far-reaching or his-
torical importance have been made by the Court than those 
establishing the respective rights of states on such rivers. 
14New Jersey v. New York (1931), 283 U. S. 473; (1933) 290 U. S. 
237· 
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The first great case arose in 1901 (finally decided in 1907), 
when Kansas attempted to enjoin Colorado from diverting 
the waters of the Arkansas River to irrigate very valuable 
lands in Colorado, to the injury of Kansas fanns for 310 
miles, theretofore irrigated, and of Kansas cattle grazers de-
pendent on the waters of the river.u; The Court laid down 
the principle that the dispute must be adjusted "upon the 
basis of equality of rights between states, so as to secure as 
far as possible to Colorado the benefits of irrigation without 
depriving Kansas of the like beneficial effects of a flowing 
stream." It held that upon the facts proved the result of ap-
propriation of water by Colorado had been the reclamation 
of large areas in Colorado, transfonning thousands of acres 
into fertile fields and rendering possible their occupation 
and cultivation when otherwise they would have continued 
barren and unoccupied; that while the influence of such di-
version had been of perceptible injury to portions of the 
Arkansas Valley in Kansas, yet to the great body of the val-
ley it had worked little, if any, detriment. The bill was 
dismissed, without prejudice, however, to the right of Kan-
sas to institute new proceedings "whenever it shall appear 
that through a material increase in the depletion of the waters 
of the Arkansas River by Colorado, its corporations or citi-
zens, the substantial interests of Kansas are being injured to 
the extent of destroying the equitable apportionment of bene-
fits between the two stat~s resulting from the flow of the 
river."16 The principle of equitable division of river water 
was thus established, in a case where one state recognized 
the local law of prior appropriation, and the other state the 
old common law of riparian rights. 
In 1922, a case was decided (after eleven years of hear-
ings), in which the local law recognized in both states was 
15 A case of lesser importance was decided as early as 1876 between 
South Carolina and Georgia when the latter State was enjoined from ob-
structing navigation and the progress of interstate commerce in the Swanee 
River. South Carolina v. Georgia (1876), 93 u. S. 4. 
16 Kansas v. Colorado (1902), 185 U. S. 125; (1907) 206 u. S. 46. 
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that of prior apprOprIatlOn. Wyoming sought to enJoIn 
Colorado from diverting from the Laramie River a vast quan-
tity of water which would deprive Wyoming farms o£ 
waters theretofore appropriated and used for irrigation. The 
Court decided that it would be equitable to determine the 
rights of the states as between themselves by the same doc-
trine of law which each state applied to individuals within 
the state. It held, therefore, that Wyoming, having made 
prior appropriations of one river, was entitled to prior rights 
in the waters; and it fixed the precise quantity of water which 
Colorado should be allowed to takeP 
In 193 I, Connecticut sought to enjoin Massachusetts from 
diverting for the water supply of the eastern part of the 
state, certain rivers tributary to the Connecticut River which 
otherwise would have flowed down into Connecticut. It 
alleged in jury to its fisheries and to its bottom lands and en-
hanced pollution of its river. The Court found for Massa-
chusetts on the facts, but permitted Connecticut to renew 
her suit whenever it should appear that her substantial in-
terests "are being injured through a material increase of the 
amount of waters diverted." (282 U. S. 660.) In 1931, 
also the doctrine of equitable division of the waters of the 
Delaware River and its tributaries was enforced in a notable 
case in which New Jersey sought to enjoin New York from 
diverting waters into the Hudson River watershed for New 
York, diminishing the flow of the Delaware River in New 
Jersey, and injuring its shad fisheries and increasing harm-
fully its saline contents. An opinion by Justice Holmes 
stated the problem strikingly:. "A river -is more than an 
amenity, it is a treasure. It offers necessity of life that must 
be rationed among those who have power over it. New 
York has the physical power to cut off all the water within 
its jurisdiction. But clearly the exercise of such a power to 
the destruction of the interest of lower states could not be 
17 Wyoming v. Colorado (I9ZZ), 259 U. S. 4I9, 496; see also Wyoming 
v. Colorado (I932), 286 U. S. 494; (I936) 298 U. S. 573 . 
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tolerated. And, on the other hand, equally little could New 
Jersey be permitted to require New York to give up its 
power altogether in order that the river might come down 
to it undiminished. Both states have real and substantial in-
terests in the river that must be reconciled as best they may 
be." The Court reduced New York's diversion from 600,-
000,000 gallons daily to 400,000,000, thus cutting New 
York's water supply from a river located within its territory 
by one-third, with a future further reduction whenever the 
stage of the Delaware fell below a certain point (283 U. S. 
336). 
Between 1831 and 1936, the State of Arizona sought, in 
three suits brought against the six states parties to the Boul-
der Dam Compact, to have its rights to the waters of the 
Colorado River adjudicated. In 1937, the States of Texas 
and New Mexico sought to adjust by suit a heated contest 
over irrigation rights involving the water of the Rio Grande 
River for a distance of four hundred miles.18 In this case, 
I served as Special Master appointed by the Court and heard 
testimony as to water rights dating back to the 16th and 
17th Centuries, as well as to the effects of modern dams 
upon the amount and chemical content of the river water and 
alleged damages. On my recommendation, the States, to-
gether with the State of Colorado, settled the case by an 
inter-state compact. 
Another phase of these vital rights to water arose in the 
great case brought by Wisconsin and five other states against 
Illinois in which six other states intervened as defendants. 
This was a suit to restrain Chicago from diverting into its 
sewage drainage canal excessive amounts of water, lowering 
the level of the Great Lakes by six inches and more, causing 
great loss of ship tonnage and damage to navigation and 
I8Arizona v. California et al (1931), 283 u. S. 423; Arizona v. Cali-
fornia et al ( 1934), 292 u. S. 341; Arizona v. California (1936), 298 U. S. 
558; Nebraska v. Wyoming (1935), 295 U. S. 40; Texas v. New Mexico 
(1939) , 308 u. S. -; ( '937) 300 u. S. 645, 302 U: S. 658; (1936) 297 u. S. 
698, 298 U. S. 644; (1935) 296 u. S. 547. 
riparian landowners. Charles E. Hughes, before he was 
Chief Justice, sat as Special Master; and the Court in 1930 
entered a decree enjoining diversion in excess of specified 
amounts. To the objections raised by the City as to the 
cost entailed of a new method of sewage disposal, the Court 
said that as for years the defendants had been committing a 
wrong, "they must find a way out at their peril. We have 
only to consider what is possible if the State of Illinois de-
votes all its powers to dealing with an exigency, to the mag-
nitude of which it seems not yet to have fully awakened. 
It can base no defenses upon difficulties that · it has itself 
created." And now, note the extreme scope of the Court's 
power and jurisdiction; for, to an objection raised that the 
decree could not be complied with under the existing state 
constitution, the Court said: "If its constitution stands in 
the way of prompt action, it must amend or yield to an au-
thority that is paramount to the state." In other words, the 
power of the Court to determine controversies between 
states under the Federal Constitution could not be impeded 
by a state constitution.19 Still another phase of water prob-
lems was presented in a suit by North Dakota in 1923, seek-
ing to enjoin Minnesota from flooding the former's farms 
by artificially caused drainage into an interstate river. (263 
U. S. 365.) 
In 1923, a situation which bade fair to produce disaster 
in many parts of Ohio and Pennsylvania was averted by a 
decision in suits brought by those states against West Vir-
ginia, involving not the flow of water but the flow of natural 
gas. For a long time, industries and homes in Ohio and Penn-
sylvania had been supplied in interstate commerce by gas 
coming from West Virginia. A statute of the latter state 
proposed to restrict the sale of gas to the needs of its own 
inhabitants. The case presented, as the Court said, "a di-
rect issue between the two states as to whether one may 
19 Wisconsin v. Illinois (1929), 278 U. S. 367; (1930) 281 U. S. 170, 
179· 
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withdraw a natural product, a common subject of commer-
cial dealings, from an established current of commerce mov-
ing into the territory of the other." The Court enjoined 
. the operation of the statute; for, it said, "if one state had 
such a power, every state had it, and embargo might be re-
taliated by embargo, and all commerce might be halted at 
state lines." The importance of the decision to the welfare 
of our states caI:mot be over-emphasized. (262 U. S. 500.) 
Other types of state controversies have been involved in 
suits which I will not take the time to narrate.20 
Finally, the extent of the Court's power is seen in the 
great case of Virginia v. West Virginia, in which after many 
decisions over a period of twelve years, the Court determined 
that West Virginia must comply with its state constitution, 
and pay its proportion of the debt of its parent state to the 
amount of over twelve million dollars. This case, said the 
Court (220 U. S. 36) was "no ordinary commercial suit but 
. . . a quasi-international difference, referred to the Court 
in reliance upon the honor and constitutional obligations of 
the states concerned rather than upon ordinary remedies."21 
I have thus tried to give you some idea of the magnitude 
of the questions presented in this phase of the Supreme Court's 
jurisdictional power, and of the vital part which its decisions 
have played in the history and development of the history 
of our states. 
The Court's achievement in this direction has been due to 
the broad vision of the men who have sat on the bench. To 
settle such questions of far-reaching import requires large-
minded men of long, mature, and varied experience. The 
spirit in which the Court has always approached these inter-
2oFor example, see New Htrmpshire v. Louisiana (1883), 108 U. S. 76; 
South Dakota v. North Carolina (1903), 192 U. S. 286; Massachusetts v. 
New York (1926), 271 U. S. 65; Alabtrma v. Arizona (1934), 291 U. S. 
286. 
21 Virginia v. West Virginia (1907), 206 U. S. 290; (1908) 209 U. S. 
514; (19 11 ) 220 U. S. I; (1911) 222 U. S. 17; (1913) 231 U. S. 89; (1914) 
234 U. S. 117; (1915) 238 U. S. 202; (1916) 231 U. S. 531; (1918) 246 
U. S. 565. 
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state cases has been finely stated by Justice Holmes in Vir-
ginia v. West Virginia, in 1911 (220 U. S. 1,25) as follows: 
"This case is one that calls for forbearance upon both sides. 
Great states have a temper superior to that of private liti-
gants, and it is to be hoped that enough has been decided 
for patriotism, the fraternity of the Union, and mutual con-
sideration to bring it to an end." And Chief Justice White 
said in the same case in 1914 (234 U. S. I 17): "In acting 
in this case from first to last, the fact that the suit was not 
an ordinary one concerning a difference between individuals, 
but was a controversy between states involving grave ques-
tions of public law determinable by this Court under the ex-
ceptional grant of power conferred upon it by the Constitu-
tion, has been the guide by which every step and every con-
clusion hitherto expressed has been controlled. And we are 
of the opinion that this guiding principle should not now 
be lost sight of, to the end that when the case comes ulti-
mately to be finally and irrevocably disposed of, as come 
ultimately it must in the absence of agreement between the 
parties, there may be no room for the slightest inference that 
the more restricted rules applicable to individuals have been 
applied to a great public controversy, or that any thing but 
the largest justice after the amplest opportunity to be heard 
has in any degree entered into the disposition of the case." 
One important phase of all these suits is to be particularly 
noted, namely, that in many cases, the mere pendency of the 
suit in the Court for long periods of time has tended to allay 
interstate feelings and to bring about amicable settlement. 
Lapse of time is a _ great mollifier-that "old common arbi-
trator, Time," as Shakespeare termed it. A chance to cool 
off is the frequent solution of many differences arising from 
irritation, anger, and unreason. Time, moreover, gives oppor-
tunity to establish the facts involved, and to make clear the 
real cause of the disagreement as distinguished from the 
ostensible factors in the suit. Time absorbed in the 
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preparation and trial often develops the fact that parties are 
not so far apart as at the beginning they supposed. The 
Court has thoroughly realized this emollient influence; and, 
while not countenancing unnecessary delays, it has regarded 
suits between states as demanding grave circumspection in 
the taking of successive steps both by counsel in trial and 
argument and by the Court itself in its rulings. 22 
In 1861, John Stuart Mill, in his Considerations of Repre-
sentative Government, said: "The Supreme Court ... dis-
penses international law, and is the first great example of 
what is now one of the most prominent wants of civilized 
society, a real International Tribunal." It took sixty-one 
years for the world to attempt to supply that want by the 
organization of the World Court. It may be admitted that 
the hopes of its founders are not yet fulfilled and that it is 
not yet certain that a world judicial tribunal can settle con-
troversies between distinct sovereign nations. And yet, those 
who thus far lack confidence, may well study the gradual 
but increasing success of the Supreme Court of the United 
States in dealing with controversial subjects of an interna-
tional character. 
It has been urged against the possibility of the World Court 
that there is no established and accepted body of law for it 
to apply, and that we must wait until the nations agree upon 
such a body of law. This contention was vigorously urged 
by the late Senator Borah in the Senate in 1926. "In order 
to have a real Court," said he, "we must have a code of law 
which that Court is to construe. You cannot set up 
22 It may be noted that the Missouri-Kentucky case, decided in 1871, had 
been pending 12 years; the Missouri-Illinois case, in 1906, for six years; 
the Kansas-Colorado case in 1907, for six years; the Virginia-West Vir-
ginia case, finally decided in 1918, had been pending 12 years; the Mary-
land-West Virginia case in 1910, for 19 years; the Oklahoma-Texas case, 
finally decided in 1926, for five years; the New York-New Jersey case 
in 1921, for 13 years; the Wyoming-Colorado case in 1922, for II years; 
the Pennsylvania-West Virginia case, argued three times l\nd finally decided 
in 1923, had been pending tour years; the Wisconsin-Illinois case in 1932, 
for six years. 
a Court of justice and expect it to operate effectively un-
less it is founded upon the solid foundation of a code of in-
ternational law accepted by the different nations of the earth 
as a guide for the detennination of the principles which 
govern its international relationships." But precisely the 
same argument was used, and unsuccessfully, one hundred 
years earlier (in 1832) by the Attorney General of Massa-
chusetts in the suit brought against that state by Rhode 
Island. Massachusetts, he contended, could not be called 
upon to submit its controversies to judicial decision until 
a law or, code suitable to the decision of her case should be 
made. "The merits of any case depend on the conformity 
of a party's conduct to a previously prescribed rule of law; 
but if there is no such rule, there can be no test of such merits 
and no decision of them. ... The Court having no law to 
expound cannot settle a judicial controversy depending, as 
all such controversies do, on the question whether the con-
duct complained of has, in the case presented, confonned to 
or departed from the obligations which are imposed by law." 
To this argument, however, the counsel for Rhode Island 
replied that the Supreme Court, like any competent court, 
in the absence of any statutory provision would govern it-
self "by the principles of justice, equity, and good con-
science," and this reply was upheld by the Court. "The 
submission by the Sovereigns, or States," it said, "to a Court 
of law or equity of a controversy between them, without 
prescribing any rule of decision, gives power to decide ac-
cording to ihe appropriate law of the case."23 
23 See also United States Supreme Court-The Prototype of a World 
Court, by William H. Taft, before World Coun Congress at Cleveland, 
Ohio, May 12, 1915, Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, No. 21 
(May, 1915): "Most controversies between states are not covered by the 
Fede.(al Constitution. That instrument does not for instance fix the bound-
ary line between two states. It does not fix the correlative rights of two 
states in the water of a non-navigable stream. ... It does not regulate 
the use which the state upstream may make of the water, either by diven-
ing it for irrigation or by using it as a carrier of noxious sewage. Nor 
has Congress any power under the Constitution to lay down principles by 
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It is interesting to note that thus far, in the one hundred 
and fifty-one years of our Government, the Supreme Court 
has never met with any form of controversy, or any condi-
tion productive of conflict between the states of the Union, 
for which the Court has been unable to discover a formula 
for its solution by resort to some principle of law, interna-
tional or otherwise, appropriate to afford just treatment to 
states entitled to an equality of right. If no actual precedent 
has existed, the Court has always found it possible to settle 
the case by equitable consideration of the needs and relations 
of human societies, and by logical extension of general prin-
ciples of justice derived from established international, com-
mon, or civil law. 
It is frequently said that the experience of the Supreme 
Court has no bearing upon the possibility of the success of 
a World Court-that the questions which arise between na-
tions are so different from those arising between the states 
of our Union, that they are not susceptible of adjudication 
by a Court. Hence, scepticism and pessimism are prevalent 
as to judicial settlement of disputes between nations. Men 
point to the lack of substantial results in the fifteen years 
of the existence of the World Court. One must bear in 
mind, however, that world changes come about slowly. It 
takes time to mould or alter the sentiments and attitudes of 
the great groups of individuals termed nations. It takes time 
to persuade them that a surrender of certain powers of inde-
pendent sovereignty may be wise or necessary to preserve 
their peace. It took many years to persuade the American 
states that a limited relinquishment of some of their rights 
and powers of state sovereignty was necessary to preserve 
the peace and union of the United States. Even after the 
adoption of the Constitution,· the states did not at first trust 
Federal law to govern such case. The Legislature of neither state can pass 
laws to regulate the right of the other state. In other words, there is 
nothing but international law to govern. There is no domestic law to 
settle this class of cases any more than there would be if a similar con-
troversy were to arise between Canada and the United States." 
the Supreme Court to decide their disputes. It took over 
fifty years to get them to accept its decisions on boundary 
questions; it was over eighty years before any other ques-
tion of importance was submitted for its decision. Gradu-
ally, however, the Court obtained the confidence of the 
states; and now its competency to decide any non-political 
question is fully recognized. So it may be with a Court de-
ciding between nations. As has been well said by a distin-
guished Englishman in recent years: "If the (World) Court 
by its practice justifies itself before the common judgment 
of civilized mankind, it is certain that the cases submitted 
to its decision will gradually increase in number and variety. 
It can hardly be hoped that the Court will render 
perfect decisions in all cases, or that every decree will meet 
with a ready acceptance by the unsuccessful party. But 
every decision that is acknowledged to be just, and every in-
stance of ready compliance, will help to make smooth the 
way toward the establishment of the ideal, which is nothing 
less than the rule of justice in international affairs. The im-
mediate problem for the present day is to make a start in 
the right direction." 
In these days . of dismal and terrible international relations, 
it is doubtless hard to believe in the possibility of any method 
of settlement of disputes between nations other than by war. 
Many men of today say: "A World Court is futile; it cannot 
preserve peace; it is and always will be a political body; it 
will not last." 
When we hear these pessimistic predictions, we should all 
recall that, one hundred years ago, great and wise men were 
saying that the Supreme Court was a failure and that the 
United States Constitution could not last. Thus, John 
Quincy Adams deliberately wrote in his Diary in 1832 that 
he gave the United States and the Constitution only twenty 
more years of life; and Chief Justice Marshall wrote: "I 
yield slowly and reluctantly to the conviction that the Con-
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stitution cannot last"; and Joseph Story, Justice of the Su-
preme Court, said: "Everything is sinking into despotism 
under the disguise of a democratic government. The Su'-
preme Court is sinking." 
Well, in spite of these prophets of disaster, the Supreme 
Court has continued to exist for one hundred years-"the 
keystone of our National fabric," as Washington termed it 
in 1789-constantly and more fully exercising its functions 
for the settlement of interstate disputes and with increasing 
success. Need we despair over the possibility of a World 
Court achieving a similar success? 
Men say that a World Court is an impractical dream. 
Well, statesmen one hundred years ago in the days of rigid 
state-rights views, would have said that it was a wild, a fan-
tastic, dream, if it had been suggested to them that in later 
years the Supreme Court would take judicial action depriv-
ing a sovereign state of 2,400 square miles of its territory, or 
would deprive a sovereign state of 200 square miles of its 
oil resources, or would limit a sovereign state in diverting 
the waters of one of its own rivers, or would cut down by 
one-third the use by another sovereign state of its river 
waters, or would require another sovereign state to establish 
at great expense a new sewerage disposal system, or would 
deprive a sovereign state of the right to control its natural 
gas, or would force a sovereign state to pay many millions 
of dollars on account of a debt to another state. All these 
things would, in 1831, have been regarded as a wild dream. 
But the dream came true. 
In answer to those who tell you that the advocates of a 
World Court are impractical dreamers, I commend to you 
the words of William Allen White: "The ashheap of the 
ages is covered with old tin cans of failures who once glis-
tened as practical men. There they rest on history's dump, 
crushed, broken, and forgotten, with all their works. The 
names that stand out in the world are the names of men of 
faith, the men of ideals, the men who snapped their fingers 
at the warnings of practical men, and went forward, follow-
ing their visions into that far more exceeding weight of glory 
which comes to the man who gives his heart's cherished 
treasures to mankind." 
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